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INTRODUCTION 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 made it unlawful for 
employers to discriminate against people on the basis of sex.2  Those 
who suffer workplace sexual harassment may establish a claim for the 
violation of Title VII because courts recognize harassment as a form of 
discrimination based on sex..3  When sex discrimination occurs in the 
context of employment, employers can be held liable and the victim-
                                                          
 1. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2004) (noting that discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, religion, and national origin is also unlawful). 
 2. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (noting that 
discrimination in the workplace often occurs with respect to compensation, terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment). 
 3. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64, 73 (recognizing a Title VII cause of action for 
“hostile environment sex discrimination”).  The Court stated that “[w]ithout 
question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of that 
subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex.”  Id. 
1
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employee can recover monetary damages.4 
Therefore, many employers have sought to insulate themselves 
from Title VII suits by establishing policies prohibiting sexual 
harassment.5  Such policies, which often forbid “unwelcome sexual 
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature,”6 have not been completely effective in 
eradicating harassing behavior.7  However, it appears that anti-
harassment policies are having some effect, as there has been a recent 
downward trend in the number of sexual harassment charges filed 
since 1997.8  In fact, in 2003, the number of charges filed was at the 
lowest point in almost ten years.9 
In cases of sexual harassment, an employer is not automatically 
liable for a supervisor’s harassment of a subordinate.  Rather, liability 
hinges on whether the supervisor used the official power bestowed 
upon him by the employer in creating the hostile work environment, 
thereby causing the subordinate to resign, in effect, a constructive 
discharge.  Those issues have been addressed by the Supreme Court 
in several cases, the most recent of which is Pennsylvania State Police 
v. Suders.10 
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
It is important to understand a series of events that often leads to 
                                                          
 4. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000)) (providing for compensatory and 
punitive damages when an individual who suffers discrimination in the workplace 
makes the requisite showing). 
 5. See generally Daniel J. Harmelink, Note, Employer Sexual Harassment 
Policies: The Forgotten Key to the Prevention of Supervisor Hostile Environment 
Harassment, 84 IOWA L. REV. 561 (1999) (examining several cases where an 
employers’ sexual harassment policies were at issue). 
 6. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2004) (noting that this conduct becomes harassment 
when an employee’s submission to harassment becomes a term or condition of 
employment, rejection of the conduct is the basis for an employment decision, or the 
conduct creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment that interferes 
with the performance). 
 7. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
CHARGES (2003) [herinafter SEXUAL HARASSMENT] (charting the number of sexual 
harassment charges filed and processed with administrative agencies from 1992 to 
2003 and denoting the filing of 15,889 charges in 1997, which was the highest in 
history), available at http://eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). 
 8. Id. (showing the decline of sexual harassment charges from 15,889 in 1997 to 
13,566 in 2003). 
 9. See id. (demonstrating that the 13,566 charges filed in 2003 was the lowest 
amount since 1993 when 11,908 charges of sexual harassment were made). 
 10. 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2350 (2004) (examining whether an employee’s claim of 
constructive discharge constitutes a tangible employment action, thereby precluding 
the employer’s affirmative defense to harassment). 
2
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss1/12
2005] PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE V. SUDERS 221 
 
someone filing charges of sexual harassment and constructive 
discharge.11  First, someone in a supervisory position sexually harasses 
an employee.12  The sexual harassment escalates to a higher level.  
When the employee reaches a breaking point, the employee resigns as 
a result of the work conditions created by the harassment.  The 
resignation occurs regardless of whether the employee reports the 
harassment to someone in a position of authority.  Finally, the 
employee files charges with a governmental agency, giving rise to the 
employee’s right to bring suit for constructive discharge and sexual 
harassment. 
A.  Constructive Discharge 
Alleged victims of sexual harassment often claim that they were 
forced to resign, or were constructively discharged, as a result of the 
hostile working environment created by the harassment. 13  In order 
to prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must prove that “working 
conditions [are] so intolerable that a reasonable employee would be 
forced to resign.”14  Prior to the Supreme Court issuing its decision in 
Suders, a split within the Courts of Appeals existed as to whether a 
constructive discharge, when proven, was a tangible employment 
action,15 thereby requiring an employer to be held strictly liable for 
harassment suffered by the employee.16 
                                                          
 11. See, e.g., Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747-49 (1998) 
(explaining that after being repeatedly harassed by a supervisor from 2003 to 2004, a 
salesperson finally quit and filed a sexual harassment claim with the EEOC, who gave 
her permission to sue her employer); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 
780-83 (1998) (stating that a lifeguard who was continuously harassed by her 
supervisors from 1985 to 1990, quit her job in 1990 and filed suit in 1992); Suders v. 
Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 435-38 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that a police communications 
operator suffered severe sexual harassment for five months, which forced her to 
resign and file suit against her supervisors and employer). 
 12. This paper does not deal with sexual harassment caused by co-workers or 
others that an employee may come into contact with in the context of employment. 
 13. See generally Cathy Shuck, Comment, That's It, I Quit: Returning to First 
Principles in Constructive Discharge Doctrine, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 401 
(2002) (explaining the history behind and the reasoning for constructive discharge 
claims). 
 14. See Easton, 325 F.3d at 443-44 (noting that some circuits require the proof of 
specific intent to cause discharge of the employee on the part of the employer). 
 15. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761 (defining a tangible employment action as 
something that causes direct economic harm because of “a significant change in 
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with 
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in 
benefits”). 
 16. Compare Jaros v. LodgeNet Entertainment Corp., 294 F.3d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 
2002) (affirming judgment in favor of the employee who claimed constructive 
discharge as a result of sexual harassment), with Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter 
Railroad, 191 F.3d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing plaintiff’s sexual harassment 
3
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Prior to the decision in Suders, the Second and Sixth Circuits held 
that a constructive discharge did not qualify as a tangible employment 
action.17  Directly opposing that view, the Third and Eighth Circuits 
concluded that a constructive discharge was a tangible employment 
action because it had consequences identical to that of an actual 
termination.18  A third position emerged within the federal judicial 
circuit, which qualified constructive discharges as tangible 
employment actions only when precipitated by an employer’s official 
act.19  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this 
disagreement among the circuits.20 
B.  Hostile Work Environment Claims 
In 1998, the Supreme Court decided the two leading cases 
examining the issues of employer liability for a hostile work 
environment created by an employee in a supervisory role.  Both 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth21 and Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton22 hold that an employer is strictly liable for discriminatory 
harassment if that harassment results in a tangible employment 
action.23  However, if no tangible employment action has occurred, 
employers may assert an affirmative defense.24 
In Ellerth, a salesperson asserted a hostile work environment claim, 
                                                          
claim because a constructive discharge was not a tangible employment action). 
 17. See, e.g., Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294; Turner v. DowBrands, Inc., No. 99-3984, 
2000 U.S. App LEXIS 15733, at *1 (6th Cir. June 26, 2000) (allowing assertion of the 
Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense because no tangible employment occurred); see 
infra notes 21-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative 
defense). 
 18. See, e.g., Easton, 325 F.3d at 447; Jaros, 294 F.3d at 966 (prohibiting the 
assertion of the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense and holding employers strictly 
liable). 
 19. See, e.g., Reed v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc., 333 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(noting that unfulfilled threats of termination are not official acts); Robinson v. 
Sappington, 351 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2003) (indicating that transferring a harassed 
employee to a position which would be “hell” for the first six months and 
encouraging her resignation could be construed as official acts). 
 20. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 803 (2004) (granting certiorari). 
 21. 524 U.S. at 742. 
 22. 524 U.S. at 775. 
 23. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-61 (relying on agency principles to conclude that 
when a supervisor acts within the scope of his responsibility, the employer is strictly 
liable for that supervisor’s sexual harassment); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 
(identifying discharge, demotion, and undesirable reassignment as tangible 
employment actions). 
 24. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805 (stating that the 
affirmative defense consists of two elements: 1) that the “employer exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and correct” harassment and 2) that the “employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage” of employer sponsored corrective 
opportunity). 
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based on a supervisor’s unwanted physical advances, offensive sexual 
comments, and threats to deny her tangible job benefits.25  Although 
the male supervisor threatened to “make [the salesperson’s] life very 
hard” unless she surrendered to his advances, he never engaged in 
conduct which rose to the level of a tangible employment action.26  
The salesperson eventually resigned without reporting the harassing 
conduct, later citing the supervisor’s harassment as the reason for her 
resignation.27 
In Faragher, a lifeguard claimed that her supervisor made 
unwanted and offensive physical contact, lewd remarks, and 
discriminatory comments regarding women.28  The City, her 
employer, had an established sexual harassment policy but failed to 
disseminate it to all employees.29  The lifeguard never filed a formal 
complaint and later resigned as a result of the harassment.30 
The Supreme Court issued its decisions on Ellerth and Faragher on 
the same day.31  To impute liability to employers for the acts of 
supervisors, the Court relied upon agency principles.32  General 
agency principles require employer liability for acts of its agents when 
conduct falling within the scope of employment causes harm.33  
Sexual harassment by a supervisor is assumed to be outside the scope 
of employment.34  However, when a supervisor is aided by the agency 
relationship in committing the discrimination, employers can be 
vicariously liable.35 
Whether employers should be held strictly liable or can successfully 
                                                          
 25. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747-49. 
 26. See id. at 748 (showing that the employer made sexual remarks about the 
employees anatomy and made physical contact). 
 27. See id. at 748-49 (claiming the supervisor’s sexual harassment caused the 
employee’s constructive discharge). 
 28. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780-81 (stating that the supervisor said he “would 
never promote a woman to the rank of lieutenant”). 
 29. See id. at 781-82 (showing that the supervisor and employee involved had no 
knowledge of the anti-harassment policy). 
 30. See id. at 780-83 (noting that employees discussed the harassment with a 
training supervisor who responded to the complaints by stating that “the city just 
[doesn’t] care”) (alteration in original). 
 31. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742 (deciding the case on June 26, 1998); see also 
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775 (deciding the case on June 26, 1998). 
 32. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759-63; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793-97. 
 33. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793. 
 34. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793-94 (noting that sexual 
harassment furthers the harasser’s interest, rather than the employer’s interest). 
 35. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791 (noting that promotion 
or termination of a subordinate is a decision which is aided by the agency 
relationship). 
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assert a defense to liability was an issue resolved in Faragher and 
Ellerth.  An employer has no defense, and is strictly liable, when 
harassment takes the form of a tangible employment action.36  
However, an employer is not automatically liable for every charge of 
sexual harassment.37  The Supreme Court articulated the Ellerth-
Faragher affirmative defense, which could be used in instances of 
harassment that did not culminate in a tangible employment action.38  
When asserting the affirmative defense, the employer has the burden 
of proof to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) 
the “employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 
promptly any sexually harassing behavior” and (2)“that the plaintiff 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer.”39  If the 
employer can demonstrate both of these elements, it can completely 
avoid liability for the discriminatory harassment engaged in by its 
employee-supervisor. 
II.  FACTS OF PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE V. SUDERS40 
The Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) hired Nancy Drew Suders in 
March 1998 to work as a police communications operator (“PCO”) in 
the McConnellsburg barracks.41  Just a few months after she began 
work, Suders claimed that she suffered severe sexual harassment and 
mistreatment at the hands of supervising officers, which ultimately 
caused her to resign in August 1998.42 
Three supervisors at the McConnellsburg barracks, Sergeant Eric 
Easton, Patrol Corporal William Baker and Corporal Eric Prendergast, 
were responsible for “instances of name calling, episodes of explicit 
sexual gesturing, obscene and offensive sexual conversation, [and 
                                                          
 36. See, e.g., Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 37. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (noting that automatic 
liability only occurs if the harassment culminated in a tangible employment action). 
 38. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 39. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65 (reasoning that the purpose of Title VII would 
best be served if employers were encouraged to create anti-harassment policies and 
employees were encouraged to report harassment); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 
805. 
 40. 124 S. Ct. at 2347 (maintaining that these facts are presented in a light most 
favorable to Nancy Drew Suders because the Pennsylvania State Police prevailed in its 
motion for summary judgment in the district court). 
 41. See Easton, 325 F.3d at 436 (noting that other officers opposed her candidacy 
because they viewed it as a political appointment, due to the assistance given to 
Suders by a Republican party official during the application process). 
 42. See id. 
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the] posting of vulgar images.”43  Sergeant Easton, the supervisor of 
the barracks, often initiated conversations with Suders regarding 
people having sex with animals.44  On several occasions, Easton sat 
near Suders’ workspace, leered at her, “put his hands behind his 
head, and spread his legs apart” while wearing spandex shorts.45  In 
Suders’ presence, Easton said to Corporal Prendergast, “if someone 
had a daughter, they should teach her how to give a good blow job!”46  
Corporal Baker, at least five to ten times per shift, would “grab hold of 
his private parts and yell, suck it.”47  He would also rub his buttocks 
and say to Suders, “‘I have a nice ass, don’t I!’”48  Prendergast 
attempted to intimidate her and verbally harassed her by calling her a 
liar.49 
Suders did not report the harassment to anyone at the 
McConnelsburg barracks.50  In June 1998, Suders approached 
Virginia Smith-Elliott, the Equal Employment Opportunity Officer for 
the PSP.51  Suders told Smith-Elliott that she might need help, but did 
not mention the details of her situation.52  In August 1998, Suders 
had reached her “breaking point,” so she contacted Smith-Elliott and 
informed her that she was being harassed and that she was afraid.53  
Smith-Elliott instructed Suders to file a complaint, but failed to tell 
Suders where she could obtain the necessary form.54  Suders claims 
that she found Smith-Elliot “insensitive” about the harassment and 
“unhelpful” in resolving the situation.55 
A few days later, Suders resigned after an incident in which she was 
set up and falsely accused of theft.56  The incident stemmed from a 
                                                          
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. at 437 (explaining that Suders asked him to stop, but Baker responded 
by gesturing once again). 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. (describing the intimidation technique as pounding on the furniture 
in Suders’ workspace while wearing black gloves). 
 50. See id. at 438 (noting that the only people at Suders’ place of employment to 
whom she could report the harassment were the ones she accused of harassment). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. (stating that neither party followed up on Suders’ allegations of sexual 
harassment). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. (noting that Suders attempted to find the form on her own, but was 
unsuccessful). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. at 438-39. 
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computer proficiency examination Suders was required to take.57  She 
had taken the exam a number of times and was told she failed each 
time.58  One day, Suders found her tests in a drawer in the women’s 
locker room and concluded that her supervisors had never forwarded 
the tests for grading and had lied about her failing scores.59  Suders 
took the examinations from the drawer.60  Her supervisors found out 
that she had removed the exams and apprehended her when she 
returned them.61  The supervisors handcuffed, questioned, and held 
Suders against her will.62  Following the accusation of theft, Suders 
resigned from her position as PCO.63 
III.  SUMMARY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RELATED TO SUDERS’ CLAIM 
A.  District Court Ruling and Analysis 
Suders brought suit in U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania in September 2000, claiming that she was sexually 
harassed and constructively discharged.64  The district court granted 
the PSP’s motion for summary judgment because Suders could not 
establish that the PSP was vicariously liable for the harassing conduct 
of the supervisors.65 
On the issue of vicarious liability, the court concluded that the 
affirmative defenses set forth in Ellerth and Faragher were 
applicable.66  As a matter of law, the PSP could successfully defend 
itself because Suders failed to report the harassing conduct and did 
                                                          
 57. See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2348. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. (noting that the officers dusted the drawer and file with theft 
detection powder which turned Suders’ hands blue when she returned the exams). 
 62. See id. (explaining that the supervisors read Suders the Miranda warning); 
Easton, 325 F.3d at 439 (noting that the officers treated her as they would any theft 
suspect). 
 63. See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2348. 
 64. See id.; see also Easton, 325 F.3d at 439-40 (explaining that the court granted 
the PSP’s motions for summary judgment on Suders’ additional claims of 
discrimination based on age, sex, and political affiliation). 
 65. See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2349; see also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 
F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990) (requiring a plaintiff who alleges a hostile work 
environment to prove that: (1) the plaintiff “suffered intentional discrimination;” (2) 
the “discrimination was pervasive and regular;” (3) the “discrimination detrimentally 
affected” the plaintiff; (4) the harassing conduct would affect a reasonable person in 
the same position as the plaintiff; and (5) the employer is vicariously liable for the 
conduct of the alleged harasser). 
 66. See Easton, 325 F.3d at 440. 
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not permit the PSP an opportunity to correct the situation.67  The 
court cited Suders’ contact with the PSP’s Equal Employment 
Opportunity Officer as being insufficient to constitute use of the 
PSP’s internal corrective process.68  Because it granted summary 
judgment on the hostile work environment claim, the court did not 
reach the question of whether a valid constructive discharge claim 
would affect the availability of the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative 
defense.69 
B.  Appellate Court Ruling and Analysis 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the 
judgment of the district court and remanded the hostile work 
environment and constructive discharge claims for disposition on the 
merits.70  In so concluding, the appellate court determined that 
Suders had alleged enough evidence for a trier of fact to conclude she 
was sexually harassed and the PSP could be held vicariously liable.71  
On the issue of vicarious liability, the Third Circuit held that summary 
judgment was improperly granted because genuine issues of material 
fact existed as to the elements of the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative 
defense.72  Specifically, the court questioned the effectiveness of the 
PSP’s remedial program and whether the PSP exercised reasonable 
care to prevent or correct the harassing behavior.73 
The Court of Appeals ruled that “a constructive discharge, when 
proved, constitutes a tangible employment action.”74  In its analysis, 
the Third Circuit determined that the District Court erred in failing 
to address Suders’ constructive discharge claim.75  To prove a claim of 
constructive discharge, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the 
harassment became so intolerable that a reasonable person in the 
employee’s position would resign76 and (2) the plaintiff’s decision to 
                                                          
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2350. 
 71. See Easton, 325 F.3d at 442-43. 
 72. Id. at 443. 
 73. See id. (questioning the conduct of the PSP’s Equal Employment 
Opportunity Officer after being contacted by Suders). 
 74. Id. at 447. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. at 444 (comparing the objective standard to a standard that exists in 
other circuits, requiring specific intent of the employer to bring about the employee’s 
discharge).  The court advised that a threshold of intolerability exists and the plaintiff 
must show that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.  Id. at 444-
45. 
9
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resign was reasonable under the circumstances.77  Applying this 
standard to the alleged facts, including offensive comments, acts of 
intimidation, sexual gestures, and the accusation of theft, the court 
concluded that the constructive discharge claim should have been 
heard because Suders had raised a genuine issue of material fact.78  If 
Suders proved that she suffered a constructive discharge, the PSP was 
precluded from using the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense.79 
C.  Supreme Court Ruling and Analysis 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split among 
the Courts of Appeals regarding whether an employer must be held 
strictly liable when a supervisor’s sexual harassment is the underlying 
cause of an employee’s constructive discharge.80  In an 8-1 decision, 
the Court held that an employer can only be held strictly liable for a 
supervisor’s harassment if there has been an “official act” 
accompanying the employee’s constructive discharge.81  The Court 
vacated the judgment of the Third Circuit and remanded the case.82 
Justice Ginsburg wrote for the majority and began the analysis by 
discussing the familiar framework set forth in Ellerth and Faragher.83  
The Court classified all hostile work environment claims on the basis 
of whether the employee had suffered a tangible employment 
action.84  It did so because “tangible employment actions fall within 
the special province of the supervisor, who has been empowered by 
the company as . . . [an] agent to make economic decisions affecting 
                                                          
 77. See id. at 445 (noting that the employee’s exploration of alternatives to 
resignation, including attempts to remedy the discrimination, might be relevant). 
 78. See id. at 446. 
 79. See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2350 (explaining that this holding precludes the use 
of the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense in all hostile work environment cases 
where the employee claims he or she suffered a constructive discharge). 
 80. See id. (“[W]hether a constructive discharge brought about by supervisor 
harassment ranks as a tangible employment action and therefore precludes assertion 
of the affirmative defenses articulated in Ellerth and Faragher”); see also Brief for 
Petitioner at 1, Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004) (No. 03-95) (“When 
a hostile work environment created by a supervisor culminates in a constructive 
discharge, may the employer assert the affirmative defenses recognized in [Ellerth 
and Faragher]?”). 
 81. See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2355-57 (noting Justice Thomas as the sole 
dissenter). 
 82. Id. at 2357. 
 83. Id. at 2352. 
 84. See id. at 2352 (noting that when harassment results in a tangible 
employment action, an employer is strictly liable but when harassment occurs in the 
absence of a tangible employment action, an employer may assert an affirmative 
defense). 
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other employees under his or her control.”85 
Justice Ginsburg addressed the issue of whether a constructive 
discharge constitutes a tangible employment action.  A plaintiff 
making a constructive discharge claim based on hostile work 
environment must show that “working conditions became so 
intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to 
resign.”86  Because a constructive discharge involves an employee’s 
decision to leave, rather than an actual termination, the Court 
determined that constructive discharge may or may not be a tangible 
employment action.87  In order for a constructive discharge to qualify 
as a tangible employment action, the supervisor must use his power to 
take some “official action.”88 
The Court draws a distinction on the basis of an “official act” 
because there may be some instances of harassment where the 
supervisor’s position of authority has little to do with the harassing 
conduct.89  If there is no “official act,” it is uncertain to what extent 
the supervisor was aided by the agency relationship and used his 
position to the employee’s disadvantage.90  In that instance, an 
employer may assert the affirmative defense. 
The Supreme Court vacated the Third Circuit’s holding that a 
constructive discharge, when proven, is a tangible employment action 
because a constructive discharge does not always occur in the 
presence of a tangible employment action.91  In its holding, the Third 
Circuit eliminated the use of the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense 
in all hostile work environment-constructive discharge claims, but 
permitted the defense in hostile work environment claims involving 
no tangible employment action.92  As a result, “the graver claim of 
hostile-environment constructive discharge [would be] easier to prove 
than its lesser included component, hostile work environment.”93  
The Supreme Court vacated the Third Circuit’s judgment and 
                                                          
 85. Id. at 2353 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. at 2355 (explaining that actual termination is always an official action 
but a decision to leave often involves no official action). 
 88. See id. at 2352-56 (providing examples of official acts, including demotion, 
failure to promote, termination, reduction in salary or benefits, dangerous job 
reassignment, and encouraging resignation rather than complying with employee’s 
request for reassignment). 
 89. Id. at 2353. 
 90. Id. at 2355. 
 91. Id. at 2355-56. 
 92. See id. (explaining that jurors would be confused because of difficulty 
formulating coherent instructions). 
 93. Id. at 2356. 
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remanded the case for a finding of fact on both the hostile work 
environment and constructive discharge claims.94 
In a brief dissent, Justice Thomas proposed that an employer 
should be liable only if the plaintiff proves that the employer 
negligently permitted the harassing conduct that caused a 
constructive discharge.95  Therefore, he agreed that an employer 
should be strictly liable if the supervisor engages in an adverse 
employment action which directly causes a constructive discharge.96  
However, Justice Thomas disagrees with the majority’s two-pronged 
affirmative defense and proposes that “where the alleged constructive 
discharge results only from a hostile work environment, an employer 
is liable if negligent.”97  He concludes that he would reverse the 
judgment by the Court of Appeals because Suders did not proffer 
sufficient evidence supporting her employer’s negligence.98 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
A.  Implications for the Courts 
The decision in Suders did not provide a definitive answer 
regarding the classification of constructive discharge as it relates to 
tangible employment actions, and the decision may have succeeded in 
further muddying the waters.  When creating the “official act” 
standard, the Court did not indicate whether its list of “official acts” 
was all inclusive or if lower courts have discretion to expand upon 
them.99  Certainly, “official acts” include the acts included in the 
Ellerth description of a tangible employment action, defined as a 
“significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, 
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different 
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in 
benefits.”100  The Court in Suders expanded this list of “official acts” 
by announcing that “a humiliating demotion, extreme cut in pay, or 
transfer to a position in which [the employee] would face unbearable 
working conditions” would also qualify.101  The Court indicated that 
                                                          
 94. Id. at 2357. 
 95. Id. at 2358 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. at 2359 (emphasis added) (indicating that if an employer knows or 
should have known about the harassment, the employer can be held liable). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 2356. 
 100. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. 
 101. See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2347. 
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“official acts” might include encouraging a harassed employee to 
resign, rather than accept reassignment, or placing a harassed 
employee in a dangerous job assignment as retaliation for not 
complying with sexual advances.102 
More troubling, the Court offers no guidance as to whether the 
alleged facts in Suders would be sufficient for “official act” 
classification.103  When three supervisors repeatedly engaged in 
offensive sexually-oriented conversations, obscene gesturing, and acts 
of intimidation, were those “official acts” under the Supreme Court’s 
new standard?  When Suders’ supervisors failed to forward her 
proficiency examinations in efforts to thwart her success in her job, 
was that an “official act”?  Would incidents likely to be reflected on 
personnel records qualify as “official acts,” such as when Suders’ 
supervisors accused her of theft, arrested and questioned her?104  This 
new standard creates more questions and may be quite tricky when 
attempting to apply it to the facts in this or any other constructive 
discharge-hostile environment case. 
B.  Implications for Employers and Employees 
The holding in Suders could be viewed as a win for employers, 
particularly in circuits where employers previously could not assert an 
affirmative defense to a claim of constructive discharge.  Now, those 
employers have an opportunity to avoid liability by use of the Ellerth-
Faragher affirmative defense.  Although this does not mean that the 
employer will automatically prevail in the case, it affords the employer 
a chance to defend its actions. 
Conversely, employees may celebrate this decision because they can 
now bring claims in circuits where a constructive discharge was 
forbidden from categorization as a tangible employment action.105  In 
                                                          
 102. See id. at 2356 (pointing out that sexual assault would not qualify as an official 
act because it involved no exercise of company authority);  see also Reed, 333 F.3d at 
34 (stating that threatened tangible employment actions that are not carried out are 
not sufficient to qualify as official acts). 
 103. See Joanna Grossman, Assessing a High Court Ruling on Employer Liability 
for Sex Harassment (June 22, 2004) (proposing that the arrest stemming from 
proficiency examinations might satisfy the “official act” requirement), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/22/grossman.scotus.harassment/index.html. 
 104. See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2353 (“Often, the supervisor will use the company’s 
internal processes, and thereby obtain the imprimatur of the enterprise.  Ordinarily, 
the tangible employment decision is documented in the official company records and 
may be subject to review by higher level supervisors.”) (omitting internal quotations 
and citations). 
 105. But see Grossman, supra note 103 (arguing that this victory is useless because 
the Supreme Court, in its holding, “has made it almost impossible for ‘constructive 
discharge’ plaintiffs ever to win”). 
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those circuits, employers were entitled to the Ellerth-Faragher 
affirmative defense.  Now, the employer is strictly liable if the 
employee can show that some “official act” precipitated the 
constructive discharge. 
No matter the jurisdiction, this decision encourages employers to 
keep a tight leash on their employees who hold supervisory positions 
because their actions could be viewed as “official acts” in the event a 
subordinate later alleges constructive discharge due to a hostile 
environment.  In doing so, an employer may wish to install a system of 
checks and balances when decisions are made that result in an 
employee transfer, reassignment, demotion, reduction in pay, or 
termination.106  In all of these instances, the change of employment 
status will likely be viewed as an “official act,” and an employer may be 
held strictly liable for the constructive discharge as a result of a hostile 
environment. 
Finally, some of the implications of this decision are unchanged 
from those of Ellerth and Faragher, which divided responsibilities 
between the employer and the victim-employee to prevent and correct 
harassment .107  Still, the burden is on the victim-employee to use an 
employer-provided remedy in order to mitigate damages for harm the 
employee could have reasonably prevented.108  The burden is on the 
employer to institute and enforce anti-harassment policies.109 
CONCLUSION 
Following the Court’s decision in Ellerth and Faragher, the number 
of charges filed related to sexual harassment decreased 
significantly.110  Likely, this trend occurred because employers 
realized the value of establishing anti-harassment policies and training 
employees as to the bounds of acceptable workplace behavior in 
efforts to insulate themselves from liability.  In deciding Suders, the 
                                                          
 106. See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2347 (stating that “a humiliating demotion, extreme 
cut in pay, or transfer to a position in which [the employee] would face unbearable 
working conditions” would qualify as an “official act”); see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 
761 (defining a tangible employment action as a “significant change in employment 
status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly 
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits”). 
 107. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 108. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07. 
 109. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (noting that effective 
anti-harassment policies are necessary in order for the employer to successfully assert 
the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense). 
 110. SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 7 (calculating that the number of charges 
filed for the years 2001, 2002, and 2003 are 15,475, 14,396, and 13,566, respectively).  
This downward trend could exist because fewer people are reporting harassment.  Id. 
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Supreme Court not only resolved a split within the Courts of Appeals 
regarding whether a constructive discharge qualifies as a tangible 
employment action, but also reinforced the duty of employers to 
oversee the acts of its supervisors.  Hopefully, the reinforcement of 
employer responsibility will positively impact efforts to eradicate 
workplace sexual harassment. 
LEILANI J. HART 
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